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ARTICLES
THE LONG COUNT ON DEMPSEY: NO FINAL
DECISION ON WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATION*
Albert W. Stone**
"But he was at a loss how it should come to pass, that the law,
which was intended for every man's preservation, should be any
man's ruin."
-Swift, Gulliver's Travels, Pt. IV, c. V, p. 242 (J. Hayward
ed., Random House, 1939)
I.
One of the principal purposes of providing tribunals for the ad-
judication of civil matters is to enable people to settle their differences
peacefully and authoritatively. To attain that purpose, some form of rela-
tively efficient proceeding must be provided, and for most human
problems it is essential that the proceeding should terminate in a final,
irrevocable, and unalterable settlement of the differences between the
parties. Although many legal proceedings are unfortunately slow and
expensive, attended by various procedural steps followed by appeals
to higher tribunals, most of them do proceed inexorably to a final settle-
ment. Thus are boundary disputes between neighbors put to rest, owner-
ship disputes result in decrees quieting title, and tort or contract dis-
putes are ended by the award or denial of damages to one or more of
the parties.
It has long been recognized that people whose vocation is irrigated
agriculture are in need of stable water rights and final adjudications
of those rights.' The Montana legislature recognized that need in 1885,
for it then provided a procedure whereby all persons who had diverted
water from the same stream could be joined in a single lawsuit, and be
subjected to one judgment which could settle the relative priorities and
rights of all of the parties to the proceeding. 2 Had this legislation been
effective in attaining its apparent goal, it would have had a significant
sociological effect, because neighbors could have settled their differences
rather than continuing to fight in the courts and at headgates over old
*This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Montana University Joint
WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER which granted funds to support
the research under the Water Resources Research Act of 1964. (P. L. 88-379,
July 17, 1964, 2nd Sess., 88th Cong.)
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. Member of the California Bar. B. A.,
University of California, 1943; LL. B., Duke University, 1948.
'This is illustrated by the attempts of state legislatures to enact stream adjudication
statutes. See the following selection of pertinent session laws: Colo., 1879, p. 94, 99,
sec. 19 and 1881, pp. 142-161; Wyo. 1890, ch. 8; Nebr. 1895, ch. 69; Ida. 1903,
p. 223, amended 1905, p. 357; Nev. 1903, ch. 4; N. Dak. 1905, oh. 34; Okla. 1905,
ch. 21; S. Dak. 1907, ch. 180; N. Mex. 1907, ch. 49; Oreg. 1909, oh. 216; Calif.
1913, ch. 586; Wash. 1917, ch. 117; Texas 1917, ch. 88 and 1967, ch. 45; Utah
1919, ch. 67; Ariz. 1919, ch. 164; and Kans. 1945, ch. 390.
'Sees. 11 and 12, pp. 132-33, Laws, 1885 (now codified in Revised Codes of Montana
(1947), see. 89-815.) This law has remained virtually unchanged to this day.
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and sore disputes. The economic effect would have been of benefit to
whole communities of people, and many other persons who also need and
deserve prompt settlement of their own problems would have benefitted
by the relieving of judges from repetitious litigation so costly to judicial
energies and time.
An earlier paper analyzed the 1885 stream adjudication statute and
concluded that in theory and concept it failed to provide a procedure for
the final settlement of peoples' differences with respect to their relative
water rights.3 That failure is due to the fact that the legislation does
not require joining all water-users in the vicinity, nor does it require
other affected persons to come forward and present their claims or be
barred. 4 It is not a "quiet title" proceeding. It is not structured so as
to allocate the physical material, the water, among claimants in the
manner that a boundary-dispute proceeding allocates the land among
the disputants.5
The article referred to above pointed out the doctrinal or conceptual
inadequacies of our statute on water rights adjudication. The present
article proposes to examine the results of the application of these inade-
quacies in our system of adjudication upon one small community of a
few more than twenty farms on a small watershed known as Dempsey
Creek.
II.
Dempsey Creek flows easterly out of the canyons in the tall and
rugged Flint Creek range into the Deer Lodge Valley, where it termin-
ates by joining the Clark Fork River just a few miles south of Deer
Lodge, the county seat of Powell County. The county is distinguished
as the place where gold was first discovered in Montana-by Francois
Finley at Gold Creek in 1852. The news of that and subsequent dis-
coveries brought the initial population to Powell County, principally
prospectors, and within a decade after the first discovery several towns
had sprung up along the tributaries of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot
Rivers. The ghost towns of Dixie, Pike's Peak, Pioneer, and Blackfoot
bear witness to these beginnings, and approximately $11,000,000, prin-
cipally in gold and silver, has been mined in the county since then.6
'Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams In Montana?, 19 MONT. REV. 19 (1957).
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947 (hereinafter cited RCM (1947)) sec. 89-815; State
ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P. 2d 653 (1935); Wills v.
Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 523, 50 P. 2d 862, 865 (1935); Sherlock v. Graves, 106
Mont. 206, 214 P. 2d 87 (1937); Cook v. Hudson, 110 Mont. 263, 103 P. 2d 137
(1940); Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 Pac. 401 (1927); and see Stone,
id. at 21, and cases reviewed in this paper.
5See generally Stone, supra, note 3.
OSee generally WATER RESOURCES SURVEY, POWELL COUNTY, STATE
ENGINEER'S OFFICE (1959), pp. 7-22.
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The town of Deer Lodge, just to the east of the 10,000 foot Flint
Creek Range7 and alongside the Clark Fork River, is near the center of
the broad, beautiful Deer Lodge Valley. The town is credited with
being the "first important business, banking, cultural, and educational
center of western Montana."8 It was the home of the first college in
Montana in 1878, and its first churches were also founded in the 1870's.
It is now the center of a farming community which depends upon irri-
gation, because the annual rainfall at Deer Lodge averages only ten
inches a year. The surrounding farmers and ranchers must make in-
tensive use of the summer run-off of seepage from winter snows in the
nearby mountains.9
As of 1958, there were 63,262 acres of irrigated land in the county,'0
and the last United States Census shows a Powell County population
of 7,002 persons." The State Engineer in his Water Resources Survey of
Powell County succinctly stated their major problem and the obstacles
to its solution: "The great problem facing the ranchers in the Deer
Lodge Valley District is the seasonally short water supply. In some
sections the soils are very porous and a large amount of irrigation water
is lost through seepage from the ditches. The District has been trying
to consolidate the main supply ditches and to line them with concrete.
So far not much success has been realized due largely to water right
difficulties and the high cost of construction."' 2
III.
What sort of "water right difficulties" were referred to in the fore-
going quotation? Can they be cleared up so that they no longer stand
in the way of improvements, developments, and even programs to pro-
vide more water by preventing waste from porous ditches? The history
of water right difficulties in the courts is instructive. To focus upon
the "difficulties," there follows a review of that history on just one
small stream: Dempsey Creek.
1. In 1891 Peter Johnson commenced an action against twenty-two de-
fendants "to determine the rights and priorities of himself and said
defendants in the waters of Dempsey Creek, for the purpose of irri-
gating agricultural lands. Upon the trial the court found all of their
rights, and classified the same, and entered judgment accordingly.' 13
One of the defendants, Herman Johnson, appealed to the Montana Su-
preme Court, because he thought that two other defendants had been
given more favorable treatment than they deserved, and that the find-
'U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY, Sec-
tional Aeronautical Chart, Butte, 50th ed., 1969 (showing the mountains rising to
10,171 feet.)
8Supra, note 6 at 12.
-Id. at 15,16.
'
0Supra, note 6 at 14.
"THE WORLD ALMANAC, p. 643 (1969 ed.)
"Supra, note 6 at 27 (emphasis added.)
nsJohnson v. Bielenberg, 14 Mont. 506, 37 Pac. 12 (1894).
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ings did not support that part of the trial court's decree which so
favored those two defendants. The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Bielen-
berg, remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
award was based upon adverse use or appropriations by the two defend-
ants. 14 They were found to have acquired their rights by appropriation
and since their priority dates were subsequent to Johnson's, Johnson
prevailed.15
The trial court's decree is known as Cause No. 404, the decree of
1892, and is one of the foundations for the determination of water
rights and the distribution of water from Dempsey Creek. Plaintiff
Bielenberg and fifteen of the defendants were decreed specific amounts
of water and priorities. Seven defendants were expressly denied rights.'6
The purpose of the proceeding was to settle all of the water rights-to
adjudicate Dempsey Creek. 17
2. That decree was but a year old when another rancher, Jeremiah
Ryan, began to divert water out of Dempsey Creek for use on his farm.
He had not previously used water and so had not been a party to the
1892 decree, but he soon found himself in court as a defendant against
eight plaintiffs who had been decreed rights in 1892. This lawsuit is
known as Cause No. 19, and it involved the re-adjudication of all of the
previously decreed rights. The decree, entered in 1902, updated the
1892 decree (because there had been some transfers of rights in the mean-
time) and added an 1893 right for Jeremiah Ryan.1 8
The files on this case in the Powell County Court House show that
Cause No. 19 is still quite active. Each year the parties petition the
district court for the appointment of a water commissioner, and follow-
ing appropriate proceedings one is appointed. Each month during the
irrigation season the commissioner files a report to the court regarding
his distribution of water, and from time to time he files an accounting
to recover from the parties his salary and expenses.
3. Soon after the entry of the 1902 decree, Jeremiah Ryan commenced
to develop a new water right, independent of anything included within
the prior two decrees, and, according to Ryan, independent of Dempsey
14Id.
'The decree shows Heran Johnson with right no. 6 (1867) and the two responding
defendants, Peter Johnson and Pat Quinlan sharing right no. 7 (also 1867). The
decree may be found at the Powell County Court House, in cause no. 404, or more
conveniently in Perkins v. Kramer, 121 Mont. 595, 609, 198 P. 2d 475, 482 (1948).
18Id.
7One Perkins was one of the defendants who was denied rights to water, but on
June 8, 1905 and following days he nevertheless diverted water from Dempsey
Creek. A petition was filed with the district court on June 23, 1905 praying that
Perkins be cited to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
In November he was found in contempt and ordered to pay a fine. In August 1906
the trial judge issued an order to the sheriff to arrest John Perkins and imprison
him until the fine was paid, but to credit toward payment two dollars for each day
that Perkins spent in jail. (From courthouse files.)
'sFiles in Powell County Courthouse, Cause No. 19. The decree is most conveniently
read in the quotation from it in the later decree in Cause No. 1671.
[Vol. 31
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Creek. He had found that Blind Lake, situated on the eastern slope
of the Flint Creek Range, had a small outflow over its eastern rim which
sank and disappeared some 1500 feet from the lake. Although it flowed
in the direction of Dempsey Creek, it was still about 3,625 feet from the
creek when it sank. He cleaned out the natural channel, dug a ditch
and built a flume to deliver the water to Dempsey Creek. He also built a
dam along the lower rim of Blind Lake, raising the water level four
feet, more than doubling the surface area of the lake, and installed a
headgate to control the timing of his deliveries of water to Dempsey
Creek. Thus, during the irrigation season he would transport the water
to the creek, allow for a 10% loss by evaporation, and divert the balance
downstream out of the creek to his land. He claimed that this was just
water which he had added to the creek.
The other parties to the 1.902 decree commenced contempt proceed-
ings, alleging that Ryan was taking more water than had been decreed
to him, and in violation of the decree. He was found to be in contempt
in both 1905 and 1906, and fined. 9
4. Ryan did not give up. He brought his own lawsuit against the
other parties to the 1902 decree, seeking to quiet title to his use of the
water by the method described above. He lost in the trial court, so he
appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the judgment and
ordered a new trial in the case known as Ryan v. Quinlan.20 The Supreme
Court held that the 1902 decree was not determinative because it did not
take Blind Lake into consideration, and that the contempt proceedings
were not res judicata with respect to substantive property rights. The
issue was whether Blind Lake was a tributary to Dempsey Creek before
Ryan installed his dam and delivery system. Since the water disappeared
before it reached the creek, it was held that prima facie it was not a
tributary and that the defendants had the burden of showing that "the
flow finds its way into the creek by a defined channel .... -21 That was
a burden the defendants could not carry.
22
5. Ryan and his wife were made defendants in still another action
because they were taking water from Alec's Gulch. This was Cause No.
702, filed in June of 1914 by William T. Elliott who was a party to the
prior decrees. Unlike Blind Lake, Alec's Gulch was found to be a tribu-
tary to Dempsey Creek and so Elliott's challenge to Ryan's claims was
sustained by judgment in 1915.23
19Id. Some of the facts are taken from Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 527, 124
Pac. 512, 514 (1912).
2Supra, note 19.
"Id. at 531, 124 Pac. at 515.
RId., and see statement of Johnson, C. J., dissenting in Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms
Co., 116 M. 152, 189, 151 P. 2d 483, 498 (1944).
nCause No. 702, Powell County Courthouse, and see WATER RESOURCES SURVEY,
POWELL COUNTY, STATE ENGINEER'S OFFICE (1959), p. 41.
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6. Ryan, W. T. Elliott and his wife Eliza, and one Martin became de-
fendants to a complaint filed by Johnson and thirteen other plaintiffs
in Cause No. 1182, filed June 23, 1919 to further adjudicate the relative
rights of the parties. The Powell County files are currently missing,
but the clerk's entries show that the case was very active, with many
proceedings and papers being filed until 1938, and then a few entries
in 1949. The survey by the State Engineer indicates that this litigation
adjudicated the rights to several lakes which are tributary to Dempsey
Creek. 24
7. The Perkins brothers had been parties to the 1892 decree, but had
been expressly denied a right.2 5 Sixteen years later they conceived a
means of developing more water in the creek during the irrigation season
by diverting late spring floodwaters into pot-holes for use later during
the irrigation season. (The factual details will be developed later in
connection with some factually related cases.)2 6 So, pursuant to the
1907 statutes providing for acquiring an appropriation on an adjudi-
cated stream,27 in 1920 they filed with the district court an application
for a water right (although they had actually been taking water for a
dozen years under this scheme and were vulnerable to a contempt pro-
ceeding.) 28 Jeremiah Ryan filed objections to the Perkins' obtaining a
water right, and the case became Perkins v. Ryan, Cause No. 1291. After
proceedings and trial the Perkins' obtained a favorable decree in May
of 1921, and thus were enabled to continue their use of water.
8. Sometime prior to 1917 one Carothers conceived the idea that he
could go up the South Fork of Dempsey Creek to a lake, now known
as Carothers Lake, raise the level of the lake by a dam to save the
spring run-off, and thus obtain a good supply for himself by letting
those waters in Dempsey Creek during the irrigation season and divert-
ing them out of the creek farther downstream. Pursuant to this idea,
Carothers posted and filed in October, 1917, but did little if anything
to actually develop his plan. Later he sold his land and rights to the
Anaconda National Bank. The land was at the confluence of the North
and South Forks of Dempsey Creek, and as it later turned out, because
of the lay of the land, it was only practical to irrigate it from the North
Fork. There were two other prior rights on the North Fork, one on
the South Fork and sixteen prior rights on the mainstream below the
confluence. (Only two rights on the whole watershed were inferior to
the right which Carothers had prior to becoming involved with this
lake development.)
2WATER RESOURCES SURVEY, supra, note 23.
2Supra, note 15 and 17.
"Infra, note 43 and accompanying text.
'Laws of Montana, 1907, c. 185.
2Indeed, one Perkins had been held in contempt for taking Dempsey Creek water in
1905 (supra, note 17), and it may have been to avoid any further difficulty that
the Perkins' brought this lawsuit.
[Vol. 31
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In August, 1923, the Anaconda National Bank brought an action
against twenty appropriators from Dempsey Creek, they being essen-
tially all of the holders of water rights, to establish the Bank's right
to water developed under Carothers' plan. (Actually, there was a modifi-
cation of Carothers' original plan, in that the Bank developed water at
Carothers Lake on the South Fork for delivery to the prior appropriators
on the mainstream below the confluence during the irrigation season,
thus reducing their claims to water from the North Fork and enabling
the Bank to divert an equivalent amount of water from the North Fork.
It was intended to be an exchange of water: let the mainstream appro-
priators take the augmented Carothers-South Fork flow, leaving the
North Fork available to the Bank.) 29
The trouble was that little if anything was done toward develop-
ment until September, 1921, when serious development commenced. The
delay since posting and filing in 1917 was held to show lack of diligence,
and so any right would not relate back to 1917 but would have to be
based upon the date of completion. But sec. 4 of the Laws of 1921 pro-
vided the exclusive method of acquiring a water right upon an adjudi-
cated stream, 30 which was to file a lawsuit similar to that filed by the
Perkins brother in Cause No. 1291 in 1920, i.e., Perkins v. Ryan.3 1 The
Bank had not proceeded in that essential manner, and since any priority
date would therefore be on the date of completion which was after the
effective date of the 1921 statute, it could not establish a right. Dempsey
Creek was conceded to be an adjudicated stream. The plaintiff Bank
appealed the adverse judgment of the trial court, rendered in 1924, but
the Supreme Court affirmed in Anaconda National Bank v. Johnson.3 2 The
decree re-adjudicated all of the rights of all of the parties along the
creek, essentially integrating the 1891 and 1902 decrees. 33
9. In April, 1872, Max Kramer commenced diverting small amounts
of water from a slough. According to Kramer the slough had little
water in it and was not connected to Dempsey Creek, which was why
neither his diversion nor the slough was mentioned in any of the subse-
quent decrees. But following the decree of 1892 there was a great
increase in irrigation above the slough, causing increased seepage into
the slough. That created a substantial source of water which Kramer
enjoyed. The drought of the early 1930's caused his neighbors to cast
covetous eyes upon this non-decreed use.
9Such an exchange of water was later accorded statutory recognition. Laws of Mon-
tana 1937, c. 39; RCM (1947) see. 89-806.
'CLaws of Montana, 1921, c. 228, see. 4; RCM (1947) sec. 89-829; Anaconda Bank v.
Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 244 Pac. 141 (1926); Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229, 250
Pac. 963 (1926).
"Supra, notes 27 and 28.
nSupra, note 30.
nThis decree may be found in the file of Cause No. 1671 in the Powell County Court-
house. It quotes both the 1892 and 1902 decrees, and restates all of the rights.
1969]
7
Stone: The Long Count on Dempsey
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1969
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
To protect himself and secure his right to the future use of the
slough, Kramer sued forty-four defendants to obtain a decree to the
first 150 miner's inches from the slough.3 4  The principal issue was
whether the slough was a natural tributary to Dempsey Creek prior to
the 1892 decree. The trial court found that it was not; therefore, it was
an independent source and Kramer had an independent right. The de-
fendants appealed to the Supreme Court and obtained a reversal of
the trial court in the case: Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms Co. 5 The
majority opinion by Justice Adair, concurred in by Justice Anderson,
reviewed the evidence, some of it pertaining to conditions subsequent
to the 1892 decree, and concluded that the slough was a tributary and
that Kramer was precluded by the 1892 decree from later asserting a
right which he could have made an issue in that proceeding.3 6 Justice
Morris concurred in the result but disagreed that a water right adjudi-
cation settles "all issues which could have been properly raised. . . . 7
Chief Justice Johnson and Justice Erickson dissented.38 They likened
the case to Ryan v. Quinlan which enabled Ryan to successfully assert
that Blind Lake was independent and not a tributary to Dempsey Creek. "9
They viewed the evidence as clear that the slough could not have been
tributary to Dempsey Creek until upland irrigation increased the seep-
age into the slough after 1892. They also agreed with Justice Morris
that a water right adjudication does not settle all issues which could
have been raised. Notwithstanding this disagreement on the Supreme
Court, Kramer lost the use of the water which he had used for twenty
years before the original adjudication of 1892 and for forty-three years
after-sixty-three years of continuous use.
10. In Cause No. 1291, Perkins v. Ryan, Perkins obtained a decree in
1921 establishing his right to take water.40 But in July, 1939, *Wood-
ward and others filed a complaint again challenging this right in the
case of Woodward v. Perkins.4 After hearing the evidence and viewing
the site, the trial court again held for Perkins, but the plaintiffs appealed
and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that Perkins
had no supportable claim to water.42 Since this case is the first of a
long and perhaps unending series, it is pertinent to set forth the facts.
'"The exact volume of flow represented by a miner's inch varies slightly from state
to state. In Montana, forty miner's inches equals one cubic foot per second. RCM
(1947) sec. 89-818.
15116 Mont. 152, 151 P. 2d 483 (1944).
'1Montana water right decrees are seldom given such a broad effect. See supra, notes
3 and 4.
87Supra, note 35 at 175, 151 P. 2d at 493.
RId. at 176, 151 P. 2d at 493.
B*Supra, note 19 and the text discussion following that note.
"0See text accompanying notes 25-28, supra. 116 Mont. 46, 147 P. 2d 1016 (1944).
"These facts appear in the dissent in the later case, Perkins v. Kramer, 121 Mont.
595, 600, 198 P. 2d 475, 478 (1948).
"*Woodward v. Perkins, 116 Mont. 46, 147 P. 2d 1016 (1944).
[Vol. 31
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In 1908 Perkins commenced to divert surplus Dempsey Creek water
during the spring run-off into four pot-holes, where he had hoped to
contain the water until needed for irrigation, at which time he would
release it into Dempsey Creek for his own use downstream. However,
the pot-holes leaked and the water seeped into the ground. Below the
base of the plateau on which the pot-holes were located, water was
found to seep out and run into Dempsey Creek. So Perkins dug two
drain ditches parallel to the creek, captured the seepage during the
irrigation season, measured the amount, contributed it to Dempsey
Creek, and after allowing for a small amount of loss, diverted the
balance out of the creek for his own use downstream.
43
The majority of the Supreme Court focused both legally and factual-
ly upon the fact that the water seeped into the earth from Perkins'
pot-holes. Legally: "When that happens it loses its character as flow
water and is no longer subject to the regulations of law which govern
while it is capable of direction and control. '44 In effect, even if he did
contribute to the seepage along Dempsey Creek during the irrigation
season, the percolating water was legally lost to Perkins as soon as it
seeped into the ground. When it seeped out again, it was to be governed
by the existing priorities of appropriation previously decreed. Factual-
ly: "The evidence is wholly inadequate to support the finding that an
additional flow in the stream had been created. . . ."" (Seemingly that
is either an alternative holding, suggesting a weakness in the prior basis,
or is irrelevant. The majority brushed aside the fact that Perkins
had already been decreed this right in 1921 in his lawsuit against Ryan,46
because the present plaintiffs were not parties to that action and so
were not bound. Justices Morris and Erickson dissented, saying that
the findings of fact and judgment of the trial court were adequately
supported and should be affirmed.4 7
11. After the reversal of the trial court in Woodward v. Perkins (above)
the victorious plaintiffs' attorney prepared a draft of new findings of
fact and conclusions of law for the trial court. Perkins' attorney ob-
jected and moved to dismiss the action, which motion was denied, so
Perkins filed an appeal in the case also known as Woodward v. Perkins.
Plaintiffs moved for a dismissal of the appeal and that was granted in
an opinion by Justice Adair who considered the case closed and res
judicata.48  Justice Cheadle concurred in the dismissal of this proceed-
ing but suggested that changed conditions might afford Perkins grounds
'The facts are elaborated in both of the cases cited in note 41, supra.
"Supra, note 42 at 52, 147 P. 2d at 1018. This proposition derives from the language
and holding in Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 124 Pac. 512 (1912).
'Id. at 53, 147 P. 2d at 1019.
"See text accompanying notes 25-28, supra.
17Supra, note 42 at 55, 147 P. 2d at 1019.
'Woodward v. Perkins, 119 Mont. 11, 171 P. 2d 997 (1946).
19691
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for a new proceeding. 49 Justice Angstman dissented, saying "I think
we have jurisdiction and power in this proceeding to order the modifi-
cation of the judgment of the trial court so as to remove the permanency
of the injunction and thus enable defendant Perkins to take appropriate
steps to have his claim adjudicated in the light of the change of circum-
stances." 50 Justice Morris also dissented, saying ". . . . it is absurd to
assume that [res judicata] was ever intended to be invoked to sustain
as here an erroneous and vicious decision such as the case of Woodward
v. Perkins. . . . The case just mentioned is so manifestly unjust that no
rule of law should be permitted to shield it from the condemnation it
clearly deserves."'"
12. Perkins petitioned for a rehearing of the foregoing decision; that
was denied, and ten days later, on Sept. 21, 1946, he filed in the Supreine
Court an original proceeding seeking a writ of supervisory control
against the district court of Powell County, asking the Supreme Court
to order the remittitur in the prior case withdrawn, and to grant him
modification of the judgment. His petition was denied in State ex rel.
Perkins v. District Court.52 His petition for a rehearing and reconsidera-
tion was also denied.58 Again the Supreme Court split, with the sanie
division as before.
13. Slightly more than a year passed after that last defeat of Perkins,
when, in February, 1947, he commenced Perkins v. Kramer, 54 a new
lawsuit against Woodward and seven other defendants, seeking a declara-
tory judgment and relief from the judgment in the first Woodard v.
Perkins.55 That first case had been decided by Justices Anderson, John-
son, and Adair, with Morris and Erickson dissenting. Of those, only
Justices Adair remained on the court when this new case was decided,
and only Justice Adair held against Perkins, dissenting bitterly to the
opinion of Angstman which was concurred in by Choate, Gibson, and
Metcalf. In this case the defendants' demurrer to Perkins' complaint
had been sustained in the trial court so the defendants had not had to
file an answer. Perkins appealed, and the majority felt that Perkins
should be permitted to try to prove that he contributed additional
water to Dempsey Creek during the irrigation season by means of his
pot-hole reservoir and seepage system. The trial court was reversed and
ordered to permit the defendants to file an answer, and Perkins to
prove the worth of his work.
'
9Id. at 29, 171 P. 2d at 1005.
50Id. at 30, 171 P. 2d at 1005.
5'Id. at 36, 171 P. 2d at 1008.
"
2See 121 Mont. 595, 606, 198 P. 2d 475, 480 (1948) for the only description of that
proceeding which has been located.
5State ex rel. Perkins v. District Court, 119 Mont. 630, 208 P. 2d 318 (1946).
"121 Mont. 595, 198 P. 2d 474 (1948).
ISupra, note 42.
[Vol. 31
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14. With his case at last favorably remanded to the trial court, Per-
kins and the defendants entered into an agreement providing for daily
measurements of the water at various points and for Perkins to receive
ascertained increments. The trial court stayed proceedings so that the
defendants did not file an answer to Perkins' 1947 complaint until 1956.
In 1957, the trial court enjoined Perkins from using the seepage water.
However, after the trial commencing in June of 1962 the court entered
judgment in favor of Perkins, granting to him rights to Dempsey Creek
water which he had commenced using in 1908, and which were decreed
to him over the opposition of Ryan in 1921, but which he hadn't estab-
lished in the Supreme Court. The evidence, as well as a visitation of
Dempsey Creek by the trial judge, was sufficient to convince him that
the seepage along the creek was identifiable as coming from Perkins'
pot-holes. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court in this second
Perkins v. Kramer case.5 6 The court split again. Justice Castles wrote
for the majority with the concurrence of Chief Justice Harrison and
Justice Adair. They found the evidence conflicting, but predominating
against Perkins because he had not shown any modern technological
evidence to trace or identify his pot-hole water as the water which seeped
out into his drain ditches along Dempsey Creek during the irrigation
season. Nevertheless, they permitted Perkins to continue to fill his pot-
holes as before in order to attempt to obtain sufficient proof, but he
was enjoined from using the seepage water during the irrigation season.
Judge Allen (pro tem.) dissented with the concurrence of Justice Harri-
son, pointing out that in the original case of Woodward v. Perkins57 as
well as in the instant case, the trial judge had taken testimony, in-
spected the sites and works, and then had rendered judgment for Per-
kins. The dissenting judges reviewed the evidence and found it favor-
able to Perkins. 58 Presumably, Perkins, at the present time, is back at
his pot-holes and at Dempsey Creek, attempting to accumulate additional
evidence to once again ask for an adjudicated water right on Dempsey
Creek, which he thought had been won in 1921 in his litigation with
Jeremiah Ryan based on his use since 1908.5sa
IV.
This last review brings up to date the chronicle of litigation on
Dempsey Creek, a small stream of less than twenty miles in length:
fourteen lawsuits with eight decisions by the Montana Supreme Court.
In nearly every one of these lawsuits, all or substantially all of the peo-
1148 Mont. 355, 423 P. 2d 587 (1966).
"8pra, note 42.
"Supra, note 56 at 365, 423 P. 2d at 592.
Wa See Infra note 58b.
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ple in the community of Dempsey Creek were litigants. There seems
little risk in predicting that the past is but a prelude to continuing and
endless litigation in the future.5sb
Other watersheds in Montana have also had multiple adjudications.5 9
Those which haven't have been fortunate thus far. Periods of drought
as well as increasing demands for water will give rise to new cases on
new streams, with no final determination of the allocation of the waters.
This history of unending litigation among neighbors on a small
watershed speaks for itself on the futility of Montana's present system
of stream adjudication. A complete overhaul of the law was introduced
in the last legislative session as part of House Bill No. 337, sponsored
b After completing this article, there appeared a per curiam opinion of the Montana
Supreme Court, entitled State ex rel. Perkins v. District Court, No. 11754, in 26
State Reporter 574 (1969).
The author is informed that Clifford Perkins asked the water commissioner for
permission to move his water into another ditch so as to benefit some land owned by
his brother. The commissioner sought advice from the district judge, but meanwhile
Perkins accomplished the change. That resulted in a contempt proceeding in which
Perkins was found guilty. Perkins then brought a writ of review to the Supreme
Court resulting in this memorandum opinion upholding the district judge.
5In State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P. 2d 653 (1935) relator
refused to obey the orders of the water commissioner and the trial judge who were
administering a prior decree on Red Rock River, to which relator was not a party.
The trial court found him in contempt, but on appeal it was held that he could not
be bound to a decree to which he was not a party, and the remedy for other water
users was to re-adjudicate the stream, making Reeder a party. Red Rock River also
gave birth to State ex reZ. McKnight v. District Court, 111 520, 111 P. 2d 292 (1941),
which dealt with three separate earlier decrees allocating the water. The trial court
ordered the water commissioner to integrate the several decrees and make a co-
ordinated distribution of the water, but on appeal it was held that since not all of the
litigants had been parties to each of the decrees, the solution was to bring another
lawsuit in which all would be joined. Whitcomb v. Murphy, 94 Mont. 562, 23 P. 2d
980 (1933) and State ex rel. Swanson v. District Court, 107 Mont. 203, 82 P. 2d
779 (1938) involved the distribution of the Sun River and its tributaries which had
been adjudicated in 1911 in Cascade County and 1890 in Lewis and Clark County.
The Whitcomb case ordered the integration of the decrees, but the Swanson case
held that the district court of one county could not recognize or administer a decree
from another county even though the tributary in question was within the court's
own county; thus, as in MeKnight v. Reeder (above) a newer and bigger lawsuit
was prescribed.
In picking out Powell County water rights in order to find the ones pertaining
to Dempsey Creek, the author found that there had been two adjudications on nearby
Race Track Creek (Bennett v. Quinlan, 47 Mont. 247, 131 Pac. 1067 (1913) which
held that the 1890 decree did not adjudicate the rights of joint ditch owners, inter
sese, to waters running in the ditch; and Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229, 250
Pac. 963 (1926), involving rights to stored water in tributary lakes). Ophir Creek,
also in Powell County produced four lawsuits (Quigley v. Birdseye, 11 Mont. 439,
28 Pac. 741 (1892); Quigley v. McIntosh, 88 Mont. 103, 290 Pac. 266 (1930);
Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P. 2d 1067 (1940), and Quigley v. Quigley,
142 Mont. 596, 386 P. 2d 60 (1963). Although the second McIntosh case dealt more
with Three Mile Creek, the facts and prior decrees also relate to Ophir Creek and
the parties are the same as in the first McIntosh case.
All of the foregoing cases were Supreme Court cases, which raises the speculation
of how many cases and trials have occurred repetitiously in the district courts but
which did not culminate in a Supreme Court opinion. If one can extrapolate from
the investigation of Dempsey Creek, he would conclude -that only a minority of such
disputes ever appear in the Supreme Court reports.
[Vol. 31
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by Representatives Stratton, Harlow, and C. Smith.60 This proposal
makes the Director of the Montana Water Resources Board the chief
administrator of water resources, 61 with authority to divide the state
into water districts with a field office in each district headed by a
district water commissioner, who functions as an agent of the Director, '
and who is in charge of as many local part-time water commissioners
as may be needed. 3
Under the proposal, persons desiring to acquire a new right would
be required 64 to follow the procedure of obtaining a permit and pro-
ceeding with orderly development pursuant to inspection and approval
by the Director or his local agents.65 If the Director is satisfied that
both the public interest and the local community will be enhanced by
the development, he will issue a Certificate of Appropriation which
ends the matter.66
The Director is required to make a physical inventory of water
uses and rights by conducting hearings, making investigations, con-
sidering protests as well as all relevant evidence, and making a final
determination of rights on a watershed basis.6 7
All final decisions, acts, or orders of the Director are appealable
to the judiciary, 6 but that neither licenses contestants to re-litigate nor
does it impose upon them the burden, expense, and delay of going
through the whole litigation over again in the courts after having
completed the administrative procedure. It is the expressed intent of
the proposed legislation that ". . . the court shall not receive or con-
sider any evidence or arguments that were not presented to the director.
" . .,69 In addition, "the inquiry upon judicial review shall extend to
OThe bill died in committee probably because Montana's brief biennial legislative
session afforded too little time to study such a comprehensive overhaul of the state's
water rights laws. Briefly, the history of that proposed legislation is that it emerged
from a study on improving Montana's law of water rights, sponsored by the Mon-
tana University Joint WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER which granted
funds to support the research and drafting under the Water Resources Research Act
of 1964. (P. L. 88-379, July 17, 1964, 2nd Sess. 88th Cong.) The initial draft was
introduced late in the 1967 legislature, and was later made the object of study by
the Water Use Priorities Committee of the House, during the interim between sessions.
That Committee went over the original draft in detail, consulted with many interested
groups and organizations and made many modifications, additions, and deletions.
These changes resulted in improving the bill, in the opinion of this author, and it
was the improved draft which was introduced as House Bill No. 337.
6 House Bill No. 337, 1969 legislative session, sec. 4. See Appendix to this article for
the bill itself.
O'Id. sec. 27.
"Id. sec. 28.
1Id. sec. 9.
1Id. sees. 11-19.
"Id. sec. 20.
67Id. sec. 6.
"Numerous sections which authorize final decisions, acts, or orders of the Director
also authorize any party adversely affected to appeal.
"Supra, note 61, sec. 37(2) (b).
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the questions whether the director has acted or proceeded without, or
in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair hearing; whether
there was any prejudicial abuse or [sic] discretion whereby the director
did not act or proceed in the manner required by law, or the order or
decision is not supported by the findings of fact, or the findings of fact
are clearly erroneous in the light of the whole record; and whether there
is relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could
not have been produced or which was improperly excluded at the ad-
ministrative hearing. '70 These restrictions will result in greatly reduc-
ing the number of appeals to the courts. They will strengthen the
administrative procedure by making the Director's decisions final in
most eases.
The heart of this legislation is the adoption of the permit system
for acquiring a water right, and the watershed by watershed admin-
istrative determination of existing rights.71 Under it, water rights would
eventually be stabilized and settled under the direction of persons whose
primary expertise, knowledge, and duty are in the field of the orderly
administration, distribution, and use of water. Such legislation would
be a great boon to Montana and to all persons who deserve a secure
and definite priority without endless lawsuits. It also would encourage
investment in water resource development by enabling developers to
know the extent to which apparently available waters have been com-
mitted to prior uses.72
V.
The only consolation arising out of the multiple adjudications on
Dempsey Creek is that it contributed much to Montana water law
by the introduction of new doctrines and the clarification of existing
doctrines through their application. Ryan v. Quinlan held that the 1902
adjudication was not conclusive against a claim which was not included
in the decree, 73 that substantive property rights cannot be adjudicated
in contempt proceedings, 7 4 that when water disappears into the ground
prima facie it is not tributary to any surface stream.7 5 Most importantly,
the case suggested that "the secret, changeable, and uncontrollable
character of underground water. . . ." makes it an unfitting subject for
the law to recognize as subject to claims and rights.76 Anaconda National
Bank v. Johnson is the principal case establishing that the 1921 legisla-
7 Id. sec. 37 (2) (c).
'See Appendix to this article for the bill itself.
"Supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
7'Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 530, 124 Par. 512, 514-15 (1912).
74Id.
NId. at 531-534, 124 Pat at 515-516.
"Id. at 532, 124 Pac at 515 (the court Was quoting approvingly from Chatfield v.
Wilson, 28 Vt. 49.)
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tion provides the exclusive means of acquiring a right on an adjudi-
cated stream. 77 Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms establishes (by one judge
who concurred in the result and two who dissented) that a water right
decree is not conclusive of all issues which could have been raised,78 and
to that extent is consistent with Ryan v. Quinlan.79 Woodward v. Per-
kins confirms the suggestion in Ryan v. Quinlan that seepage water is
not subject to the regulations of law "which govern while it is capable
of direction and control" :80 However, it weakened that proposition by
finding that there was insufficient proof that the seepage water con-
tributed to Dempsey Creek during the irrigation season, 81 and said that
seepage water belongs to the stream and to the prior appropriators. 82
The second Woodward v. Perkins case held that a party cannot obtain
an appeal from the entry by the district court of judgments handed
down from a prior appeal, or the entry of findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law under those circumstances.8 3 Three justices (one concurring
in the result and two dissenting justices) said that changed conditions
can enable a party to bring a new action for the adjudication of a water
right.84 State ex rel. Perkins v. District Court found that a writ of super-
visory control is not available to one who thinks that the trial court's
judgment (after an appeal) is unfair.85 Perkins v. Kramer held that res
judicata should not preclude the showing of changed conditions nor the
re-litigation of a water rights suit,8 6 thus confirming one aspect of the
second Woodward v. Perkins case.87 By necessary inference Perkins v.
Kramer overruled the suggestion in Ryan v. Quinlan88 and Woodward v.
Perkins8 9 that once water seeps underground it is legally lost to the
prior possessor, for it held that if Perkins could prove the underground
facts then he should be permitted to claim the water which seeped out
along the creek.90 The latter important point of groundwater law is
confirmed in the second Perkins v. Kramer case, for after quoting from
Ryan v. Quinlan the court made this far-reaching concession: "Modern
hydrological innovations have permitted more accurate tracing of ground-
-
TAnaconda National Bank v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 244 Paz. 141 (1926).
71Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms Co., 116 Mont. 152, 176 (Morris) and 176-77 (Johnson
and Erickson), 151 P. 2d 483, 493-94 (1944).
79Supra, note 73.
'Woodward v. Perkins, 116 Mont. 46, 52, 147 P. 2d 1016, 1018 (1944).
Iid. at 53-54, 147 P. 2d at 1018-1019.
'Id. at 53, 147 P. 2d at 1019.
'Woodward v. Perkins, 119 Mont. 11, 171 P. 2d 997 (1946).
Id. at 29 (Cheadle) and 35 (Angstman and Morris), 171 P. 2d at 1005, 1008.
'State ex rel. Perkins v. District Court, 119 Mont. 630, 208 P. 2d 318 (1947), which
is described more fully in Perkins v. Kramer, 121 Mont. 595, 606, 198 P. 2d 475,
480 (1948).
'Perkins v. Kramer, supra, note 85.
'Supra, note 84.
'Supra, note 76.
'Supra, note 80.
'Perkins v. Kramer, supra, note 85.
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water movement. For this reason, we feel that traditional legal dis-
tinctions between surface and groundwater should not be maintained
when the reason for the distinction no longer exists . ..."91 There was
no dissent to that point, which takes a major step toward legally inte-
grating surface and groundwater law, and which recognizes the hydro-
logic interrelationship of water on the ground and water under the
ground.
Dempsey Creek is a microcosm of Montana water law, not merely
because of its contributions to the development of water rights doctrines:
Dempsey Creek presents a portrait of the gap between the objectives of
water rights settlement by adjudication and the practices which are
generated by our statutes on adjudication.
Such legal development must be cold solace to the neighbors on
Dempsey Creek, who would probably agree with this statement from
one of their own cases:
Experience has shown that after the right of all of the parties
taking water from a stream had been adjudicated, a subsequent
appropriator would appear upon the scene, tap the stream and ruth-
lessly take the water, disregarding the decree rights and flaunting
the orders of the commissioner appointed by the court to distribute
the water according to the terms of the decree. The only remedy
the prior appropriators had was to commence a suit against the
new appropriator, the result being that all of the rights of the stream
had again to be adjudicated; and after that decree was entered, if
another subsequent appropriator took the water the same process
had to be gone over again ....
t Perkins v. Kramer, 148 Mont. 355, 363, 423 P. 2d 587, 591 (1966).
"Anaconda National Bank v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 410-411, 244 Pac. 141, 144 (1926).
Also see supra, note 58b.
Appendix-House Bill No. 337
89-121, 89-122, 89-123, 89-125, 89-801 through 89-864, 89-1001 through 89-1024,
89-2911 through 89-2936.
A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE
REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE UTILIZATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION OF THE WATER RESOURCES OF
MONTANA; REPEALING SECTIONS 89-121, 89-122, 89-123, 89-125, 89-801
THROUGH 89-864, 89-1001 THROUGH 89-1024, AND 89-2911 THROUGH 89-2936,
R.C.M. 1947. "1
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF MONTANA:
Section 1. Declaration of policy.
Pursuant to the declaration of the Montana constitution that any use of water is a
public use, the legislative assembly of Montana hereby declares:
It is the policy of the state of Montana to encourage the development of Montana
water resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the public
interest, and to provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of the waters
of the state for the maximum benefit of the people of Montana.
The foregoing policy shall be effectuated by providing for the utilization and
development of water for actual beneficial use consistent with the public interest,
under the supervision of the Montana water resources board responsible for the
proper utilization, development, and conservation of the water resources of Montana.
An appropriator shall not be entitled to use more water than he can beneficially use
for the purposes for which the appropriation was made. 16
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Section 2. The state department of health and the water pollution control council
shall maintain the same jurisdiction and responsibilities heretofore delegated to them
by law in administering water of Montana.
Section 3. Definitions of terms used in this chapter.
(1) "Water" means all water of the state, surface and subsurface, regardless
of its character or manner of occurrence.
(2) "Groundwater" means that water occurring in the saturated zone beneath
the shallowest water table.
(3) "Person" means any natural person, association, partnership, corporation,
municipality, irrigation or other special district, the state of Montana or any political
subdivision or agency thereof, and the United States or any agency thereof.
(4) "Beneficial use" means a use of water for the benefit of the appropriator,
of other persons, or of the public, that is reasonable and consistent with the public
interest, including, but not limited to, domestic, agricultural, irrigation, industrial,
mining, power, municipal, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses.
(5) "Appropriation right" means a right to a beneficial use of water, with or
without a diversion from the source of water, which is conferred or recognized by this
act, and water quality control.
(6) "Director" means the director of the Montana water resources board.
(7) "Existing right" means a right to the use of water which would be pro-
tected under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of this act, provided that
actual construction of works for application of water to a beneficial use must com-
mence prior to the effective date of this act.
Existing rights shall include beneficial uses by the public for recreational pur-
poses when the source has been subject to substantial continuing regular public use,
as of when that use became substantial; provided that this use does not conflict with
another recognized water right.
Existing rights are appropriation rights, and are subject to the provisions of this
act. (8) "Fish, wildlife, and recreation uses" include but are not limited to providing
or preserving flowing or still water for fish propagation, fish and wildlife habitat and
feeding grounds, and sports fishing, hunting, boating, swimmin, and other recreational
opportunities.
(9) "Well" means any artificial openin or excavation in the ground, however
made, by which groundwater can be obtained or through which it flows under natural
pressures or is artificially withdrawn.
(10) "Aquifer" means any underground geological structure or formation which
is capable of yielding water or is capable of recharge.
Section 4. Powers and duties of director.
The director shall:
(1) Enforce and administer the laws of this state pertaining to the beneficial
use of water, and control, conserve, regulate, allot and aid in the distribution of the
water resources of the state for the benefit and beneficial use of all its inhabitants
in accordance with the rights of priority of appropriation.
(2) Prescribe procedures, forms, and requirements for applications, permits,
certificates, and proceedings under this act.
(3) Adopt, amend, repeal, and promulgate such reasonable rules and regulations
as may be necessary or desirable for the discharge of his duties and for the achieve-
ment of the purposes of this act.
(4) Employ and fix the compensation of such assistants and employees as are
necessary for the operations authorized or required by this act.
(5) Maintain such records as the Montana water resources board may deem
necessary, administer oaths, and do all things incidental to the powers and duties
conferred or imposed by this act.
(6) Delegate any of the administrative duties, functions, or powers imposed
upon him to any responsible assistant or employee.
Nothing contained in this act shall repeal, amend, nor modify any existing statutes
pertaining to the powers and duties of the director except as otherwise expressly
provided in this act.
Section 5. Director shall gather hydrologic data.
The director shall, as often as necessary, gather, record, evaluate, and publish data
on the location, quantity, and quality of the waters of the state. Such data shall in-
clude, but shall not be limited to, information concerning the condition of ditches,
wells, pipelines, and other appropriation works, and all water appropriations. The
gathered data shall be used by the director in considering applications for new water
appropriations, in deciding controversies regarding the distribution of water, and in
discharging other powers or duties conferred or imposed by this act.
Section 6. Administrative inventory and determination of existing rights. 17
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(1) The director shall gather data essential to the proper understanding and
deterimnation of the existing rights of all persons using water for beneficial purposes.
In gathering data pertaining to the determination of eixsting rights, the director may
select and specify areas or sources where the need for a determination of existing
rights is most urgent. Such observations and measurements shall be reduced to writing
and made a matter of record in the director's office. The data gathered by the di-
rector shall include but shall not be limited to:
(a) any decree adjudicating water rights in a proceeding commenced prior to
the effective date of this act, which shall be determinative of the rights of the parties
thereto, according to the terms of such decree. If there are persons who claim rights
which were not so determined when a source of water was adjudicated, any such
decree shall be only prima facie evidence of the decreed rights. To the extent that
any decree is incomplete, the director shall have authority to ascertain the additional
facts necessary to a complete understanding of the decree, and to the application of
the decree to any particular situation;
(b) records of rights acquired pursuant to the 1961 groundwater code (Section
89-2911 through 89-2936, R.C.M. 1947) which shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein;
(c) the findings of the water resources survey which was conducted pursuant to
Section 89-847, R.C.M. 1947. Such findings shall be prima facie evidence of rights
existing as of the dates of the findings;
(d) declarations of existing rights filed by water users pursuant to this section,
relating to the area or source under consideration. The director shall make orders
requiring all appropriators within specified areas or from specified sources to file
declarations of existing rights within three (3) months after the effective date of
any such order. Notice of an order requiring the filing of declarations of existing
rights shall be given by conspicuous publication once a week for four (4) weeks prior
to its effective date in a newspaper of general distribution in the affected area. The
director shall also cause notice of the order to be given by registered mail to any
person required to file of whom the director has notice or knowledge or who has
requested mailed notice to be given when the director adopts an order requiring the
filing of declarations of existing rights.
The declaration shall be under oath and stated on personal knowledge or on a bona
fide information and belief, and shall be in such form and contain such information as
the director, by regulations, may prescribe. Such required information may include,
but shall not be limited to, the date work was begun on the appropriation, the date
the water was first applied to a beneficial use, and a true copy of any notice or claim
upon which the existing right was initiated or is based;
(e) the findings of such inspections, surveys, reconnaissance, and investigations
of the source or area involved as the director may make. Such findings shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein found;
(f) if a detailed survey is necessary, the costs of such survey shall be borne
one-half (1/2) by the state. The other one-half (%_) of the costs will be apportioned
among the users involved in the determination.
(2) On the basis of all data obtained, the director shall make a preliminary
determination of existing rights for the area or source under consideration. The
director shall prepare a summary or such determinations of all existing rights in
the area or from the source involved, and shall mail a copy to each person who has
filed a declaration in the proceeding.
(3) Any person who has filed a declaration in the proceeding, who feels ag-
grieved at the preliminary deterination, may request a hearing thereon before the
director. A request for a hearing pursuant to this subsection shall be in such form
as the director may prescribe, and must be received in the office of the director
within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the preliminary determination. If
more than one (1) hearing is requested for a particular area or source, the director
may in his discretion consolidate hearings. Notice of the hearing shall be sent to all
persons who have filed declarations.
(4) The director shall, on the basis of the preliminary determination and on
the basis of any hearings that may have been requested, make a final order determining
each existing right in the area or from the source undr consideration. The director
shall issue certificates of each existing right in duplicate. The original of such cer-
tificate shall be sent to the holder of the existing right and shall be recorded with
the county clerk and recorded in the county wherein the point of diversion, if any,
or place of use is located in the same manner as other instruments affecting real
estate. The duplicate shall be a matter of record in the office of the director.
(5) If a person fails to file a declaration as required under this section, and
the person shall later assert any right to the water, the director in his discretion
may proceed to determine such tardily asserted right. If in the director's opinion
any person would be injured by the recognition of a tardily asserted right, the
director may refuse to proceed with a determination of such right. 18
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In no event shall the director proceed to determine a tardily asserted right,
unless such right is asserted within one year of the effective date of the original
final order for that area or source.
Tardily asserted rights shall be determined by the director in the same manner
as any other existing right, according to the provisions of this section. Provided,
that persons whose rights were determined by the original final order for the
area or source affected shall not be required to refile their declarations.
(6) Any person feeling aggrieved by a final order determining existing rights,
or by the director's determination of or refusal to determine a tardily asserted right,
may obtain review by a proceeding for that purpose, in the nature of an appeal,
in accordance with the provisions of this act relating to appeals. Any final order
determining existing rights shall be in full force and effect beginning thirty (30)
days after its entry in the director's records, and shall remain in effect unless and
until overruled on appeal.
Section 7. District court clerks shall furnish director with copies of water
decrees.
The clerks of the various district courts of the state of Montana shall furnish
the director with copies of all decrees affecting water rights.
Section 8. Regulation of water distribution pending director's determination of
existing rights.
As of the effective date of this act, the director shall supervise all distribution
of water. This supervisory authority shall include the supervision of all water
commissioners appointed prior to the effective date of this act.
Pending the director's preliminary determination of existing rights, such rights
shall be ascertained by reference to pertinent judicial decrees, records of rights
acquired pursuant to the 1961 groundwater code Sections 89-2911 through 89-2936,
R.C.M. 1947), and the findings of the water resources survey which was conducted
pursuant to Section 89-847, R.C.M. 1947. Where the foregoing sources of information
are incomplete, existing rights shall be deemed to correspond with local usages
concerning recognition of water rights.
Section 9. Acquisition of appropriation rights generally.
Henceforth no person shall have the power or authority to acquire a new ap-
propriation right to the use of water from any source without first obtaining the
approval of the director, and no water rights of any kind may be acquired hereafter
solely by use, adverse use, adverse possession, prescription, or estoppel.
Section 10. Exemptions for limited appropriations, appropriations for certain
uses, and appropriations from certain areas or sources.
(1) The director may adopt regulations providing that appropriations for less
than specified quantities of water, appropriations for specified purposes, appropriations
from specified areas or sources, or appropriations excluded by one or more of the
above specifications, shall be exempted from those requirements of this act concerning
applications for permits which relate to inspections, notice, objections, and hearings,
and from the requirements relating to perfection and notice of completion of ap-
propriations. Such exemptions may be modified or terminated from time to time
by new regulations, without affecting rights acquired under such exemptions.
(2) If the application is for an exempted appropriation, and if the director
determines from the application that the proposed use is beneficial and comes within
the terms of the exemption, he shall forthwith approve the application and issue
the permit.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a regulation establishing exempted appropriations
or by the director's approval or disapproval of an application for an exempted ap-
propriation, may obtain review by a proceeding for that purpose, in the nature
of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act relating to appeals. A
regulation establishing exempted appropriations, or the director's approval or dis-
approval of an application for an exempted appropriation, shall be in full force
and effect beginning thirty (30) days after its entry in the director's records, and
shall remain in effect unless and until overruled on appeal.
Section 11. Application for a permit to appropriate water.
Any person intending to appropriate water shall apply for a permit from the
director, and shall not appropriate the water except with the director's approval. The
director may in his discretion require an application for a permit to include such
information as the director may deem useful and appropriate, including but not
limited to the name and address of the applicant, the source from which the ap-
propriation is to be made, the maximum rate at which the water is to be appropriated
and the total annual quantity of water sought to be appropriated, and if the water
is to be diverted the location of the proposed appropriation works, the location of
the place of use and estimates of the time required to begin construction and to
apply the water to the proposed beneficial use.
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A defective application shall be returned for correction or completion together
with the reasons for returning it. An application shall not lose priority of filing
because of defects with the director within thirty (30) days after its return to
the applicant, or within such further time as the director may, by an order of
record, allow. Applications shall be recorded in a book kept for that purpose.
Section 12. Inspections of proposed appropriations.
Upon the receipt of an application for an appropriation permit, the director
may make any inspection he shall deem necessary of the proposed works, the
source of the water, the location of the proposed use, and other water demands
or uses in the area, to determine whether there is any likelihood that the proposed
appropriation will adversely affect other persons or the public interest.
Section 13. Applications for permits: notice to public, to affected appropriators,
and to representatives of the public interest.
Upon the receipt of a proper application for a permit other than an application
for an exempted appropriation, the director shall prepare a notice containing the
facts pertinent to the application and shall cause it to be conspicuously published,
at the applicant's expense, in the newspaper of general circulation in the affected
area, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. The director shall also cause
copies of the notice to be served personally or by ordinary mail upon any person
likely to be affected by the proposed appropriation, of whom the director has
notice or knowledge. The director shall also cause notice to be served upon any
person who represents any public interest likely to be affected by the proposed
appropriation.
The notice shall state that any person may, within fifteen (15) days after
the third date of publication or the date of mailing of notice, whichever occurs
later, file with the director an objection to the application.
Section 14. Applications for permits: objections.
Objections must be filed within fifteen (15) days after the third date of publi-
cation or the date of mailing of notice, whichever occours later.
Objections must state the name and address of the objector, and facts tending
to show that there are no unappropriated waters in the proposed source, that the
proposed means of appropriation are inadequate, that the property, rights, or
interests of the objector would be adversely affected by the proposed appropriation,
or that harm to the public interest would be caused by the proposed appropriation.
Section 15. Hearings on applications and objections.
(1) The director shall examine any objection that may be filed, and if he
determines that it states a prima facie valid objection to the issuance of the permit,
he shall set a time and a place for a hearing on objections within one (1) year
from the date the objections were filed, and cause notice of the hearing to be
served personally or by registered mail upon the applicant and the objectors.
(2) If no valid objection is filed against the application, the director shall
within one (1) year approve the application and issue the permit on the basis of
the information contained in the application, the director's inspections, if any,
and the director's records of appropriation rights and hydrologic data, disapprove
the application or issue an interim permit.
(3) No application shall be approved in a modified form or upon terms, con-
ditions or limitations specified by the director, nor denied, unless the applicant is
first granted an opportunity to be heard. If no objection is filed against the ap-
plication, but the director is of the opinion that the application should be approved
in a modified form or upon terms, conditions or limitations specified by the director,
or that the application should be denied, or whenever the director thinks that the
application should be modified or denied, the director shall prepare a statement
of his opinion and the reasons therefor. The director shall cause the statement
of his opinion to be served personally or by registered mail upon the applicant,
together with a notice that the applicant may obtain a hearing by filing a request
therefor. Said notice shall further state that the application will be modified in
a specified manner, or denied, unless a hearing is requested.
(4) Any person feeling aggrieved by the director's approval, modification,
or denial of an application may obtain review by a proceeding for that purpose, in
the nature of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act relating to
appeals.
Section 16. Interim permits.
Pending final approval or denial of an application, the director may, in his
discretion, issue an interim permit authorizing an applicant to begin appropriating
water immediately. The director may issue an interim permit subject to any terms
and conditions he may deem proper, and he may revoke an interim permit at any
time and for any reason. 20
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Section 17. Specific factors governing approval or denial of applications for
appropriation permits.
(1) If there are unappropriated waters in the source of supply, and the proposed
appropriation neither will impair uses under other appropriation rights nor pre-
judicially and unreasonably affect the public interest, the director shall promptly
approve the application. Otherwise the director shall deny the application or require
its modification to protect the public interest and uses under other appropriation
rights.
(2) In determining whether a proposed appropriation will impair a use under
another appropriation right, impairment shall include but shall not be limited to the
unreasonable raising or lowering of the static water level or lake or reservoir water
level, or the unreasonable increase or decrease of the streamflow or the unreason-
able deterioration of the water quality at the affected appropriator's point of
diversion or use, beyond a reasonable economic limit.
(3) In determining whether a proposed appropriation will prejudicially and
unreasonably affect the public interest, the director shall consider all matters per-
taining to the question of the continued availability of appropriable water, in-
cluding such matters as the area, safe yield, and recharge rate of aquifers, the
seasonal changes in streamflows, and the status of other appropriations on the proposed
water supply; the values to the applicant likely to result directly from the proposed
use of the water; the benefits to the state and to the locality likely to result in-
directly from the proposed use of the water; the losses likely to result from the
preclusion or hindrance of potential alternate uses of the water; the impairment of
the property, interests, and rights of other persons likely to result from the proposed
appropriation; the harm to the public that would result from the impairment of
fish, wildlife, and recreational values; public water supplies and maintenance of
sufficient water in streams to dilute waste effluents; and the good faith, intent,
and ability of the applicant to successfully complete the proposed appropriation.
Section 18. Terms and conditions of appropriation rights.
(1) An appropriation right is a right to a beneficial use of water, and does
not include an absolute right to a particular means or point of withdrawal or
diversion, nor a right to prevent reasonable changes in the condition of water oc-
currence, such as the increase or decrease of a streamflow or the raising or lowering
of a water table or water level, or of artesian pressure, caused by later appropriators,
provided the prior appropriator can reasonably acquire his water under the changed
conditions. In determining whether the prior appropriator can reasonably acquire
his water under the changed conditions caused by later appropriations, the director
shall determine whether both the prior and the later appropriators' means of appro-
priation are reasonable and consistent with the state of development in the area in
which the water source is situated.
(2) Subject to the requirements of Section 15 of this act relating to hearings
and appeals, the director may approve an application in a modified form or upon
any reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations he shall deem necessary for the
protection of the public interest and the rights of other appropriators.
Section 19. Seasonal and temporary permits.
Seasonal and temporary permits may be granted under the provisions of this act
relating to ordinary permits. The right to appropriate water under a seasonal permit
shall be limited to that portion or portions of the calendar year expressly stated in
such permit. A temporary permit may be granted by the director. A temporary
permit shall not vest in the holder thereof any permanent right to use of water and
shall expire and be cancelled by the director in accordance with the terms of the
permit.
Section 20. Perfection of appropriation rights; affidavit of proper completion;
certificate of appropriation right.
(1) If any water is to be diverted, an appropriation permit issued by the
director shall reasonably limit the time for commencement of construction of the
appropriation works, completion of construction, and actual application of the water
to the proposed beneficial use. In fixing the foregoing time limits, the director
shall consider the cost and magnitude of the project, the engineering and physical
features to be encountered, and, on projects designed for gradual development and
gradually increased use of water, the time reasonably necessary for such gradual
development. For good cause shown by the holder of the permit, the director may
extend any time limits.
(2) Upon the actual application of the water to the proposed beneficial use
within the time allowed, the holder of the permit shall furnish the director with
an affidavit, stating that the holder of the permit believes that the appropriation
has been properly completed. The director may then inspect the appropriation, and
if he is satisfied that the completed appropriation substantially complies with the
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permit, he shall issue a certificate of appropriation right in duplicate. The original
of such certificate shall be sent to the holder of the appropriation right and shall be
recorded with the county clerk and recorder in the county wherein the point of
diversion, if any, or place of use is located, in the same manner as other instruments
affecting real estate. The duplicate shall be made a matter of record in the office
of the director.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the director's issuance of or refusal to issue
a certificate of appropriation right may obtain review by a proceeding for that
purpose, in the nature of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act
on appeals.
Section 21. Recognition of existing rights; priority dates of existing and future
rights.
(1) Existing rights and their priority are hereby recognized as valid appro-
priation rights.
(2) Rights acquired under the provisions of this act shall have priority as
of the date applications axe received in the office of the director.
Section 22. Revocation of permits.
If the work on an appropriation is not commenced, prosecuted, or completed
within the time stated in the permit or any extension thereof, or if the water is
not being applied to beneficial use as contemplated in the permit, or if the permit
is otherwise not being followed, the director may require the holder of the permit
to show cause why the permit should not be revoked. If the holder of the permit
fails to show sufficient cause, the director may revoke the permit.
Any person aggrieved by the director's revocation of, or refusal to revoke, a
permit, may obtain review by a proceeding for that purpose, in the nature of an
appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act on appeals.
Section 23. Changes in appropriation rights.
(1) An appropriator may change the point of diversion, place of use, nature
of use, place of storage or make a seasonal or temporary change, or rotate his use
of water provided that such an action does not adversely affect the rights of other
persons or the public interest.
(2) The director may inspect to determine whether there is any likelihood
that the change will adversely affect other persons or the public interest. If any
person claiming to be injured by the change files an objection meeting the require-
ments of Section 14 of this act, within one (1) year after the date the change
was actually made, the director shall hold a hearing in compliance with Section 15
of this act.
Section 24. Sales and other transfers of interests in appropriation rights.
(1) An appropriation right may either be appurtenant to or severable from
the land or place upon which it is used. An appurtenant right shall pass with a
conveyance, or transfer by operation of law, of the land, unless specifically excepted
therefrom. All transfers of interests in appropriation rights shall be without loss
of priority.
(2) A copy of any instrument which transfers an interest in an appropriation
rights shall be filed with the director by the person receiving the appropriation
interest, and the director shall maintain a record of such filings.
Section 25. Right to construct dams and raise water-conducting water over
lands and railroad rights of way.
The right to conduct water from or over the land of another for any beneficial
use includes the right to raise any water by means of dams, reservoirs, or embank-
ments to a sufficient height to make the same available for the use intended, and
the right to any and all land necessary therefor may be acquired upon payment of just
compensation in the manner provided by law for the taking of private property
for public use; provided further, that if it is necessary to conduct the water across
the right of way of any railroad, it shall be the duty of the owners of the ditch
or flume to give thirty (30) days notice in writing to the owner or owners of
such railway of their intention to construct a ditch or flume across the right of
way of such railroad, and the point at which the said ditch or flume will cross the
railroad; also the time when the construction of said ditch or flume will be made.
If the owner or owners of such railroad or their agent fail to appear and attend
at the time and place fixed in said notice, it shall be lawful for the owner or
owners of the said flume or ditch to construct the same across the right of way of
such railroad, without further notice to said owner or owners of the railroad.
Section 26. Administration supervision of water distribution.
(1) The owner or manager of any appropriation works shall maintain, at
his own expense and to the satisfaction of the director, substantial and efficient
controlling works, and any measuring devices the director may require, and these
shall be so constructed as to permit of efficient appropriation, accurate measurement,
and effective regulation of the water that is appropriated.
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(2) The director shall have authority to require any appropriator to report the
readings of measuring devices at reasonable intervals, and to file reports on appro-
priations, in such form, containing such information, and at such reasonable intervals
as the director may require.
(3) The director shall supervise the distribution of water among appropriators.
The supervision shall be governed by the principle that first in time is first in
right, except as provided in subsection (7) of this section. However, goundwater
sources shall be treated as separate from surface water sources, unless an appropria-
tor shall demonstrate to the water commissioner or director that sources of ground-
water and surface water are so closely interrelated that it is practical to integrate
their administration.
(4) Whenever a water distribution controversy involving a claimant of an
existing right arises upon a source of water in which existing rights have not
been determined according to Section 6 of this act, the director may on his own
motion and shall on the petition of one or more of the parties to the controversy
proceed within a reasonable time to determine existing rights in the source, according
to Section 6 of this act.
(5) If the director shall ascertain, by any means reasonably deemed sufficient
by him, that any person is wasting water, using water unlawfully, or preventing
water from moving to another person having a prior right to use the same, the
director may:
(a) regulate the controlling works of any appropriation as may be necessary
to prevent the wasting or unlawful use of water, or to secure water to a person
having a prior right to its use; and the director may attach to the controlling works
a written notice properly dated and signed, setting forth the fact that the con-
trolling works have been properly regulated by him, which notice shall be legal
notice to all persons interested in the appropriation or distribution of the water;
or
(b) order the person wasting, unlawfully using, or interfering with another's
rightful use of the water to cease and desist from so doing, and to take such steps
as may be necessary to remedy the waste, unlawful use, or interference; or
(c) request the attorney general to bring suit to enjoin such waste, unlawful
use, or interference.
(6) The director may make orders establishing controls for any area or
source of water, by which priority of rights of appropriators may be enforced by
apportionment, rotation, reduction, or cessation of uses of appropriation rights.
Such orders shall be preceded by notice in accordance with Section 13 of this act.
After giving notice, the director shall hold a hearing on the proposed controls,
for the purpose of giving interested persons an opportunity to express their views
on the proposed controls. The director may also make any inspections he deems
necessary concerning the proposed controls. The director may order controls on the
basis of his inspections, if any, his records of appropriation rights and hydrologic
data, and the views expressed at the hearing.
(7) The director may make orders approving agreements among appropriations
in any area or from any source providing for controls such as apportionment,
rotation, reduction, cessation, or proration of uses. However, no such agreement
shall be approved which is not consistent with the protection of the public interest
and the rights of other persons.
Orders approving agreements on controls shall be made according to the pro-
cedures of subsection (6) of this section.
Upon the director's approval, the agreement shall govern the distribution of
water as therein provided. The director may, for any reason deemed sufficient by
him, dissolve any such agreement at any time, and, upon notice to the affected
appropriators, distribute the water according to the principle that first in time is first
in right.
(8) Any person aggrieved by an administrative order or action regulating the
distribution of water may have the same reviewed by a proceeding for that purpose,
in the nature of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act on
appeals.
Section 27. Field offices and district water commissioners.
(1) The director may divide the state into water districts and establish a
field office for each district, for the purpose of securing the best protection to all
appropriators and the economical and efficient supervision of water distribution. As
the director shall deem necessary he may at any time change the boundaries of water
districts to better serve the intent and purposes of this section.
(2) The director shall appoint one (1) district water commissioner for each
field office, to be selected by the director from among persons recommended by the
several boards of county commissioners of the counties into which the water district
extends. Each county shall have authority to recommend district water commissioner
1969]
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candidates. Vacancies shall be filled according to the same procedure as that used
for original appointments.
(3) Each district water commissioner, before entering upon the discharge of
his duties, shall take and subscribe an oath before the judge of a state court of
record, to faithfully perform the duties of his office, and file said oath with the
secretary of state, together with his official bond, in the penal sum of one thousand
dollars ($1,000), the bond to be executed by a surety company authorized to do
business within the state, and conditioned upon the district water commissioner's
faithful discharge of his official duties.
(4) District water commissioners shall be full-time state employees, and their
salaries and official expenses shall be paid from the state general fund. Salaries
shall be fixed by the director.
(5) A district water commissioner shall serve at the pleasure of the director.
(6) The district water commissioner shall be the director's agent in supervising
the distribution of waters within the water district, and shall perform such other
duties as the director may require. The district water commissioner shall have authority
to regulate the controlling works of any appropriation within the district, under the
general supervision of the director. All regulation of controlling works shall be ac-
companied by a notice, in accordance with Section 26 (5) (a) of this act.
(7) The district water commissioner shall have the power, within his district,
to arrest any person violating any of the provisions of this act and to deliver such
person promptly into the custody of the sheriff or other competent officer within the
county. Immediately upon such delivery the water commissioner making the arrest
shall, in writing and under oath, make complaint before the proper justice of the
peace against the person so arrested.
Section 23. Part-time water commissioners.
(1) Upon application by an interested appropriator making a reasonable show-
ing of the necessity therefor, which application shall have been approved by the
district water commissioner, the director shall select and appoint a part-time water
commisioner for any area or source where the director deems closer regulation of water
distribution to be necessary. A part-time water commissionr shall be appointed to serve
at such times and for such periods as local conditions may indicate to be necessary
to provide the most practical supervision and to secure to appropriators the best
protection of their rights.
(2) A part-time water commissioner shall comply with the provisions of Section
27 (3) of this act concerning an oath and a bond.
(3) Salaries of part-time water commissioners shall be fixed by the director.
The salaries and official expenses of part-time water commissioners shall be borne by
the appropriators receiving the benefits and shall be paid monthly, in the following
manner:
A part-time water commissioner shall be paid for the time actually employed,
and shall be compensated for official expenses actually incurred. Each appropriator
shall pay his proportionate share of the total cost of the ratio that the amount of
water he is authorized to use bears to the total amount of water authorized for use
from the source of water, during each month. On or about the first of each month
the part-time water commissioner shall present to each appropriator a statement of his
proportionate share of the cost of maintaining such services for the preceding month.
Where the appropriators are organized into an association, the statement shall be
presented to the proper officers of such association for payment.
Upon the failure of any appropriator to pay his share of the expense referred
to in this section, the part-time water commissioner may, with the approval of the
district water commissioner, prevent further use of water by the delinquent appropriator
until payment is made. The county attorney for the county in which such appropriator 's
appropriation is located shall, upon request of the district water commissioner, bring
suit in any court of competent jurisdiction, and is authorized to recover for said
part-time commissioner any such unpaid share.
(4) A part-time water commissioner shall serve at the pleasure of the district
water commissioner.
Section 29. Abandonment and forfeiture of appropriation rights.
(1) If an appropriator ceases to use all or a part of his appropriation right
with the intention of wholly or partially abandoning the right, or if he ceases using
his appropriation right according to its terms and conditions with the intention of not
complying with such terms and conditions, the appropriation right shall, to that extent,
be deemed abandoned and shall immediately expire. If a partial or total cessation of
use, or a failure to use an appropriation right according to its terms and conditions,
continues for ten (10) successive years, that shall be prima facie evidence that an
intent to abandon occurred.
(2) If an appropriator ceases to use all or part of his appropriation right, or
ceases using his appropriation right according to its terms and conditions, for a period 24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/1
1969] THE LONG COUNT ON DEMPSEY 25
of fifteen (15) successive years, the appropriation right shall be deemed forfeited in
whole or in part, regardless of whether the appropriator intended abandonment.
(3) Procedure for declaring appropriation rights abandoned or forfeited.
When the director is informed that an appropriator may have abandoned or for-
feited his appropriation right, or when another appropriator shall claim that he has
been or will be injured by the resumption of use of an appropriation right alleged to
have been abandoned or forfeited, the director shall serve notice requiring the ap-
propriator to show cause why his appropriation right should not be declared abandoned
or forfeited. The notice shall include the following information:
(a) a description of the appropriation right in question;
(b) a statement that unless due and sufficient cause is shown the appropriation
right will be held to have been abandoned or forfeited, for specified reasons;
(c) the time and place of the hearing.
The notice shall be served personally or by registered mail, and shall be served or
mailed at least thirty (30) days before the hearing. The notice shall be served upon
the appropriator of record at his last known address.
Within sixty (60) days after the hearing, the director shall make an order deter-
mining whether the appropriation right shall be held abandoned or forfeited, and he
shall notify the appropriator as to the contents of the order by registered mail.
The director's order declaring the abandonment or forfeiture of a water right
shall be in full force and effect beginning fifteen (15) days after its entry in the
records of his office, unless and until its operation shall be stayed by an appeal
from the order.
Any person aggrieved by the director's refusal to initiate abandonment or for-
feiture proceedings, or by an order declaring that an appropriation right has or has
not been abandoned or forfeited, may obtain review by the proceeding for that pur-
pose, in the nature of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act on
appeals.
Section 30. Reservation of waters.
(1) Any water users' association, municipality, irrigation or other special dis-
trict, the state of Montana or any political subdivision or agency thereof, the United
States or any agency thereof, or any other representative of the public interest, may
request the director to reserve any public waters from the appropriation and use for
existing or future beneficial uses, or to maintain a minimum flow, level, or quality
of water therein, throughout the year or at such periods or for such length of time
as the director shall designate.
(2) Upon receiving such a request, the director shall give notice in accordance
with Section 13 of this act and, in accordance with Section 26 (6) of this act, hold
a hearing and decide whether to reserve the water. The director's costs of giving
notice, holding a hearing, conducting investigations, and making records, incurred in
acting upon a request to reserve water, shall be paid by the party making the request.
(3) From and after the adoption of an order reserving waters, the director may
reject an application and refuse a permit for the appropriation of reserved waters,
or may issue the permit subject to such terms and conditions as the director may deem
necessary for the protection of the objectives of the reservation.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the director's adoption of, or refusal to adopt,
an order reserving waters, may obtain review by a proceeding for that purpose, in the
nature of an appeal, in accordance with the provisions of this act on appeals.
Section 31. Legal assistance for water officials.
The county attorneys and the attorney general shall perform such legal services
and bring such legal proceedings in carrying out the purposes of this act within their
respective counties as the director or district water commissioners request, and may
employ private counsel.
Section 32. Appropriation by means of reservoirs; permits to appropriate by
means of reservoirs.
(1) Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, a reservoir is a means of
appropriating water which includes groundwater recharge, and in itself does not con-
stitute a beneficial use of water. A right in a reservoir is limited to a right to use the
reservoir as a means of applying water to a beneficial use.
(2) If the state of Montana constructs a reservoir for a public purpose or in the
interests of the public, the impounding of the water in the reservoir shall constitute
a beneficial use of water.
(3) A person intending to appropriate water by means of a reservoir shall apply
for a permit as prescribed by Section 11 of this act. Applications to appropriate water
by means of a reservoir may include, in addition to information required by the
director under Section 11 of this act, any of the following information that the
director in his discretion requires:
(a) a general description and the dimensions of the proposed construction or
enlargement of the dam; 25
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(b) the location, type, size, and height of the proposed dam and appurtenant
works;
(c) the storage capacity of the reservoir for each foot in depth;
(d) the means, plans, and specifications by which the stream or other body of
water is to be dammed, by-passed, or controlled during construction;
(e) subsoil and foundation conditions, including conditions disclosed by any
drilling or other prospecting that the director in his discretion requires the appropriator
to perform;
(f) a description of the land to be submerged;
(g) a description of the beneficial uses to be made of the impounded waters;
(h) rainfall and streamflow records, flood flow records and estimates, and
the area of the drainage basin.
(4) Appropriation by means of reservoirs is controlled by this section and sec-
tions 11 through 18, 20, 21, and 23 of this act. It is unlawful to construct, reconstruct,
repair, operate, maintain, enlarge, remove, or alter any dam except in compliance
with these sections and the other applicable sections of this act.
(5) When repairs are necessary to safeguard life or property, they may be
started immediately; but the director shall be notified forthwith of the proposed repairs
and of work under way, and the repairs shall be made to conform to his orders.
(6) Prior to approving an application to appropriate water by means of a
reservoir, the director may require a surety company bond in an amount sufficient to
secure the costs to the state in assuring the safety of any dam partially constructed,
and in assuring the protection of the water supply against the possibility that an
appropriation by means of a reservoir might be left incomplete.
Section 33. Records of director's actions.
The director shall make and preserve a true and complete transcript of all pro-
ceedings and hearings conducted under this act. After any hearing, investigation, in-
spection, survey, or reconnaissance, the director's decision shall be rendered in writing.
Section 34. Entry on land.
Any persons authorized by the director may enter upon any land to carry out the
purposes of this act after giving reasonable notice to the land owner. A person,
entering land under the authority of this section, is responsible for any damage done
to the property.
Section 35. Penalties.
Any person who violates or refuses or neglects to comply with any provision of
this act, or of any order, rule, or regulation promulgated by the director, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars
($25) nor more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each offense.
Section 36. Fees.
(1) The director shall collect the following fees:
(a) ten dollars ($10) with each application for a permit to appropriate water;
(b) three dollars ($3) for certifying a document;
(c) the cost of recording documents with county clerks and recorders where
recording is required by this act;
(d) five dollars ($5) for issuing a certificate of an appropriation right;
(e) five dollars ($5) with each declaration of an existing right;
(f) five dollars ($5) with an objection to an application for a permit;
(g) three dollars ($3) for recording a document for the director's records.
(2) Fees collected shall be deposited in the state general fund.
Section 37. Appeals.
Any person authorized by this act to obtain review of an administrative act,
decision, or order may appeal in the following manner:
(1) Review of acts, decisions, and orders of district or part-time water com-
missioners:
Within twenty (20) days after the act, decision, or order complained of, the
appellant shall file a written statement of objections with the director. The statement
of objections shall be under oath and stated on personal knowledge or on bona fide
information and belief, and shall be in such form and contain such information as the
director may prescribe. Such information shall include the names and addresses of any
other persons of whom the appellant has or readily could obtain knowledge, who are
likely to be affected by the director's decision on appeal. Within twenty (20) days
after receiving a statement of objections, or sooner if practicable, the director shall
hold a hearing upon the objections. The director shall require notice of the hearing
together with copies of the statement of objections, to be served or mailed at least
ten (10) days before the hearing, by personal service or certified mail, upon all per-
sons likely to be affected by the director's decision on appeal, of whom the director
has or readily could obtain knowledge. 26
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Notice of the hearing shall be served upon the water commissioner whose act,
decision, or order is being reviewed, and the water commissioner shall respond to the
statement of objections before the day set for the hearing.
The director shall conduct the hearing at a convenient and suitable location in the
vicinity where the controversy arose. Persons required to be given notice, who appear
at the hearing, shall be given an opportunity to be heard at the hearing.
As soon as practicable after the hearing, having regard to the best interests of
the persons concerned and the urgency of the matter, the director shall render his
decision. The director's decision shall affirm, reverse, modify, or vacate the water
commissioner's decision or order, and shall be in full force and effect as soon as
entered in the director's records and remain in effect until reversed, modified, or
vacated upon a further appeal. Notice of the director's decision shall be served by
personal service or by ordinary mail, upon all persons required to be given notice
of the hearing.
(2) Judicial review of original or appellate acts, decisions, and orders of the
director:
(a) appeals shall be taken to the district court of the county in which the point
of diversion, if any, or place of use is situated. Within twenty (20) days after the act,
decision, or order complained of, the appellant shall file with the court a copy of the
order appealed from, together with a petition stating the grounds of appeal. A copy
of the petition shall be served upon the director who shall answer it within twenty (20)
days from service thereof, and with the answer transmit to the court the records and
files, duly certified, in the manner on appeal. A copy of the answer shall be served
upon the appellant. The court shall require notice of the appeal, together with copies
of the order appealed from the the petition, to be served by personal service or regis-
tered or certified mail, upon the persons required to be given notice under subsection(1) of this section. Notice shall be served or mailed at the same time that the appellant
files his petition.
The court shall set the matter for hearing, and notice of the hearing shall be
served upon the persons required to be notified of the appeal.
(b) the court shall decide the appeal upon the petition; the answer; the
director's duly certified records and files, including evidence presented before the
director as reported by the director's official stenographer and reduced to writing;
briefs filed with the court that were furnished, reasonably in advance of the judicial
earing, to all persons required to be given notice; and evidence presented at the
judicial hearing.
Except in its discretion for good cause shown, the court shall not receive or
consider any evidence or arguments that were not presented to the director reasonably
in advance of the director's act, decision, or appealable order complained of.
(c) the inquiry upon judicial review shall extend to the questions whether the
director has acted or proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there
was a fair hearing; whether there was any prejudicial abuse or discretion whereby
the director did not act or proceed in the manner required by law, or the order or
decision is not supported by the findings of fact, or the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous in the light of the whole record; and whether there is relevant evidence
which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or which
was improperly excluded at the administrative hearing.
(d) where the court finds that there is relevant evidence which, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or which was improperly ex-
cluded at the administrative hearing; the court may enter judgment remanding the
case to the director to be considered in the light of such evidence, without limiting
or controlling in any way the discretion legally vested in the director, or the court
may admit such evidence at the judicial hearing without remanding the case.(3) Appeals from applicable decisions of the district courts:
Appeals in water controversies may be taken from the district courts to the
supreme court, in the same manner as in other civil cases.
Section 38. Section 89-121, Section 89-122, Section 89-123, and Section 89-125,
R.C.M. 1947; Sections 89-801 through 89-864, R.C.M. 1947; Sections 89-1001 through
89-1024, R.C.M. 1947; and Sections 89-2911 through 89-2936, R.C.M. 1947 are repealed.
19691]
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